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Previous studies of the impact of capital requirements on bank portfolio 
decisions typically assume that the deposit rate paid by banks is not a 
function of the riskiness of the bank's portfolio.  Such studies conclude that 
stiffer capital requirements decrease portfolio risk but may increase the 
probability of bankruptcy.  These studies have utilized the mean-variance 
framework  (Koehn  and Santomero),  the state-preference framework  (Kareken  and 
Wallace),  and the Capital Asset Pricing Model  (Lam  and Chen). 
In this study,  we utilize the cash flow version of the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model to show how the impact of capital requirements depends on the 
response of deposit rates to bank leverage and portfolio risk. Following 
Merton (1977), we model the deposit insurance premium as a put option. 
Allowing deposit rates to vary with risk and leverage mitigates agency 
problems that appear in previous studies as incentives to increase bank risk 
and maximizes the value of the deposit-insurance subsidy.  We find that the 
variance of earnings and the incentive to increase leverage are reduced with 
risk-  and leverage-related interest rates.  However, the impact of increased 
capital requirements on portfolio behavior is generally ambiguous. 
4 CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS AND OPTIMAL BANK PORTFOLIOS: 
A REEXAMINATION 
I.  Introduction 
Many studies have analyzed the impacts of bank regulation on bank 
behavior.  Some have argued that federal deposit insurance and capital 
requirements,  which were designed to improve the safety of the banking system, 
may instead create perverse incentives for bank behavior.  Most proposals to 
redesign the regulatory system consider mechanisms to force banks to "pay" for 
increased risk.  Proposals for either risk-based capital requirements or 
risk-based deposit insurance have been presented,  and there have been both 
theoretical and empirical analyses of the two systems  (see  Avery and Belton 
[I9871 and Hanweck [I9841  ) .  Increases in capital requirements are another 
possible regulatory response. 
Theoretical analyses of the impact of increased capital requirements 
typically assume that bank borrowing rates are unaffected by bank risk.  The 
combination of Regulation  Q,  whtch governs deposit-rate ceilings,  and 
fixed-rate deposit insurance premiums implies that explicit deposit costs are 
unaffected by bank risk.  Fixed-rate deposit insurance premiums,  of course, 
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have perverse incentive effects.  Not only do low-risk banks subsidize 
high-risk banks,  but the deposit insurance agency also provides a subsidy. 
Fixed-rate deposit insurance creates incentives for banks to engage in risky 
behavior to maximize the deposit insurance subsidy. 
This view of banks as attempting to maximize the deposit insurance 
subsidy is discussed by Keeley and Furlong  (1987)  and Kane  (1986).  With fixed-rate deposit insurance,  the impact of the subsidy on portfolio behavior 
is not diminished by an increase in the deposit insurance premium, as would be 
the case if the insurance agency were to adjust its rates when the bank 
engaged in more risky behavior. 
On the other hand, there is a growing body of literature discussing 
"correct pricing" of deposit insurance.  Initially,  Merton  (1977)  showed how 
*  deposit insurance can be viewed as a put option',  and others  (Marcus  and 
Shaked [1984],  Osterberg and Thomson [1987],  Pennacchi [1987],  Pyle [1986], 
and Ronn and Verma [1986]) have indicated how a correctly priced insurance 
premium would vary with changes in bank leverage or portfolio variance.  In 
this paper we analyze the impact of increased capital requirements on bank 
portfolio decisions if deposit costs increase with leverage and portfolio 
variance  . 
Analyses of the impact of increased capital requirements that utilize the 
mean-variance framework  (see  Koehn and Santomero [1980]) conclude that 
increased capital requirements will reduce portfolio risk.  These studies view 
banks as utility maximizers.  Koehn and Santomero contend that banks will 
respond to  the imposition of higher capital requirements by reshuffling their 
portfolios.  Banks with relatively risky portfolios will tend to shift toward 
even riskier portfolios, while safe banks will shift in the same direction to 
a lesser extent.  Thus, portfolio reshuffling tends to partially offset the 
intended effects of the increased capital requirement. 
In addition, it is possible that increased capital requirements may 
increase the probability of bankruptcy.  These studies assume that deposit rates are constant and thus unaffected by bank risk.  They also ignore the 
subsidy provided by the insurer.  In effect, the subsidy reduces the net cost 
of deposits. 
While the mean-variance analyses focus on utility-maximizing behavior, 
other approaches examine value-maximizing  behavior.  Kareken and Wallace  - 
(1978)  utilize the state-preference framework.  Although they assume that the 
deposit rate does not increase with bank risk,  the presence of fixed-rate 
deposit insurance creates the incentive to increase leverage.  Since the 
subsidy from the guarantor increases with leverage,  the cost of deposits,  net 
of the insurance subsidy, decreases with leverage.  In addition,  banks may 
have an incentive to increase asset risk.  These results have been used to 
justify restrictions on asset choice and leverage. 
Lam and Chen  (1985)  utilize a cash flow version of the Capital ~sset 
Pricing Model  (CAPM)  to analyze the impact of increased capital requirements 
on bank behsvior when Regulation Q is removed.  This framework distinguishes 
between internal risk and external risk.  Internal risk is characterized by 
the variance of asset returns net of interest costs;  external risk refers to 
covariation of net asset returns with the market.  Thus,  in the absence of 
Regulation Q, interest costs may covary with asset rates of return as well as 
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with the rate of return on the market portfolio.  However, deposit rates do 
not covary with the total risk of the bank.  So,  although deposit rates are 
stochastic,  they do not vary in a manner that would necessarily reduce the 
liability of the deposit insurer.  In this case,  the effects of tighter 
capital requirements on internal risk and total bank risk are ambiguous. 11.  Agency Problems,  Deposit Insurance,  and Capital Requirements 
Any analysis of the impact of capital requirements must consider the 
incentives to increase leverage  (that  is,  to lower the capital ratio) facing 
the banking firm.  We contend that incorrectly priced deposit insurance 
creates an agency problem that is responsible for an incentive for increased 
leverage.  The failure to resolve this agency pro%lem  makes capital 
requirements binding. 
The optimal financial structure of banks in the absence of fixed deposit 
rates or deposit insurance is determined by the same factors that influence 
the financial structure of nonfinancial entities  (see  Sealey [I9851 for a 
dissenting view).  Conflicts of interest among managers, stockholders, and 
bondholders  (depositors)  are the essence of agency problems and are one likely 
factor in explaining financial structure  (see  Pyle  [1986]).  In theory  (see 
Smith and Warner  [1979]), financial contracts such as bond covenants can be 
written so as to resolve such conflicts.  Maximizing the value of equity and 
maximizing the total value of debt and equity then lead to equivalent 
behavior. 
Previous analyses of the impact of capital requirements on bank portfolio 
behavior do not make explicit the factors that determine bank leverage.  In 
the mean-variance analysis of Koehn and Santomero,  deposit costs are fixed, 
although there is no explicit deposit insurance.  In the state-preference 
analysis of Kareken and Wallace,  deposit rates are fixed and some deposits are 
insured.  In the stochastic deposit-rate case of Lam and Chen, there is no 
deposit insurance.  In all of these cases, the capital requirement is assumed 
to be binding.  Excluded from these analyses are discussions of the factors that give the bank the incentive to increase leverage.  We do not propose an 
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agency-theoretic explanation of financial structure in the absence of deposit 
insurance.  However,  the literature on agency problems and financial structure 
gives us some insight into how correctly priced deposit insurance alters the 
impact of capital requirements on bank behavior. 
Given the assumptions of the option-pricing model of Merton (1977),  in 
the absence of Regulation Q and deposit insurance,  the rate paid on bank 
deposits increases with portfolio variance and leverage.  In  fact, as shown by 
Thomson (1987),  the market-determined risk premium built into deposit rates 
would be equal to the insurance premium that reduces the value of the FDIC's 
claim to zero.  In  an  earlier paper  (Osterberg and Thomson [1987]) we show 
that if deposit insurance is priced correctly,  the value of the bank is 
unaffected by the presence of deposit insurance.l  This premium is the 
"fair" or correctly priced premium that eliminates the incentive problems 
created by fixed-rate insurance. 
We propose that one likely rationale for the result in earlier 
analyses that the capital constraint is binding is the implicit assumption of 
incorrectly priced deposit insurance.  If the deposit insurance premium is 
fixed at any rate, including zero, then the subsidy provided by the insurer to 
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the equity-holders  increases with portfolio variance and leverage.  If deposit 
insurance is correctly priced,  and in the absence of other factors that would 
determine financial structure,  we can see no reason for the capital constraint 
to be binding. 111.  The  Model 
Following  Lam  and  Chen,  we  use  the cash flow version of  the CAPM  to model 
the banking firm.  We  modify  their model  to allow for an  endogenously 
determined  cost of  deposits.,  and we  make  the usual assumptions  necessary for 
the CAPM  to hold.  In addition, we  assume  that bankruptcy costs and  taxes are 
zero and  that the bank is operated by  its owners.2~  The  owners  seek to 
maximize  the value of  bank  equity, V, where 
and  R  = one  plus  the risk-free rate; 
= aggregate cash flow of  all firms  in the market; 
- 
7r = cash profit of  the bank; 
CV(% ,c) = covariance between  the cash profit of  the bank  and  the 
aggregate cash flow of  all firms (systematic risk within the  CAPM 
framework) ; 
X = market  price of  risk-bearing services. 
Suppose  that there are N  risky assets in which  the bank  can invest.  Let 
Aj  and  Zj  be  the amount  invested in asset j and  the uncertain return on 
asset j,  respectively.  Furthermore,  the bank  issues only  insured deposits,  D, 
and  a fixed amount  of capital, K.  The  bank  pays  its deposit guarantor 
(henceforth,  the FDIC)  a premium  of  g per dollar of  deposits.  Its expected 
cash profits at the end  of  the period are Following Lam  and  Chen,  we  partition XCV(Z,%) into internal portfolio risk 
and  external risk by  separating the aggregate cash flows fi into ;i  and 
E,  where  W  is the aggregate cash flows  in the market excluding the 
bank.  This allows us to isolate the risk of  the asset portfolio (internal 
risk) from  market  risk in the maximization  problem.  Equation (1)  can now  be 
expressed as 
1  (3)  V  =  [E(Z) -  XCV(Z,G) -  XCV(Z,Z], with 
and  aiBj  = covariance between rates of  return on  asset i and j; 
a.  = covariance between rates of  return on  asset j  and  cash  J .w 
flows of  all other firms. 
A 
The  deposit insurance premium,  g, varies with the bank's  leverage and 
asset portfolio decisions  (internal risk).  Since  the bank  knows  how  its 
choices influence g, it knows  what  g results from  its asset portfolio and 
capital structure decisions. 
One  covenant  imposed  on the bank  by  the FDIC in exchange  for its deposit 
guarantees  is the minimum  ratio of  deposits to capital, C - D/K. A  second restriction is the balance-sheet constraint that sources of funds 
must equal uses of funds.  Thus,  the problem facing the bank is to maximize V 
with respect to Aj  and D,  subject to 
ir 
(5)  D 5 CK  (where  D = CK when the capital constraint is binding). 
Let 7 and yl  be the Lagrangian multipliers associated with  (4)  and 
(5),  respectively,  and let L be the Lagrangian function.  The first-order 
conditions of the constrained maximization problem are: 
(k  =  1,2,  ...,  n), 
Adding equations  (6)  and  (7)  and solving for 7, yields 
A binding capital constraint  (assumed  from here on) implies that rl  >  0,  or that equity value could be  increased with a looser capital 
requirement.  Expression  (6)  implies  that the marginal expected returns from 
each risky asset are equal.  7,  equals risk-adjusted return on  assets 
less the cost of  deposits.  .Changes  in leverage and  portfolio composition also 
affect 7,. 
We  assume  that the FDIC  views  deposit insurance as a put option on  the 
bank.  Thus,  we  utilize Merton's  (1977)  put option formulation, which 
indicates how  g varies with portfolio variance and  leverage.  We  do  not 
assume,  however,  that the deposit guarantor  correctly prices the  insurance so 
as to drive the net value of  the FDIC's  claim to zeio (see Osterberg and 
Thomson  [1987]).  Since  the deposit guarantee is not correctly priced,  the 
agency  problem  is not completely  resolved, and  the stockholders still have 
incentives to increase the  leverage of  the portfolio and  the portfolio risk 
(hence  the binding capital constraint).  However,  we  assume  that the FDIC  does 
not make  relative pricing errors in setting g.  That is, we  assume  that the 
FDIC can measure  risk correctly and  that it charges  the same  premium  to all 
banks  with the same  risk profile.  Moreover,  the premium  is an  increasing 
function of  asset portfolio risk and  leverage. 
Assuming  g  is set according  to an option-valuation formula allows  us  to 
a g  a g  a €3  sign :%and  -.  Let  -=  6  2 0  and  ,=  p r 0. By  the chain rule 
a%  aD  a u 
ag - ad  *  and therefore,  %- =  2p 2  Aioi,k 2 0,  Substituting CK,  6, and 
aAk  8%  ao2'  a  Ak  i=l 10 
n 
2p~~iui,k  into equation  (11)  and  rearranging gives us 
i-1 
n 
(12)  2[X  +  pCK]  CA,U,,,  +  Ry,  +  CK6  = P,  -  R  -  g -  Xq,,,  (k - 1,2,  ....,  n). 
i=l 
As in Lam  and Chen,  the right side of  equation  (12)  represents  the expected 
spread associated with investing in asset k aqusted for external risk.  Note 
that the risk-based deposit insurance premium  affects portfolio decisions 
through  g's effect on  the risk-adjusted spread and  through  the  p  and  6 
terms  on  the left side of  (12). 
To  derive the optimal portfolio shares,  A;,  we  solve the N  + 1 
equation system of  equations comprised of  equations  (4) and  (12)  for the  N  + 1 
unknowns  (the N  asset shares and  the multiplier rl).  Following Lam and 
Chen,  the solution for optimal asset shares from  this system of  equations is 
n 
n  j=1  1~k.j  n  n 
(13)  A;  =  [2(X +  ~cK)]-'(  1  vkPj[tj  -  Ao.  J .w ]  -  1 1~~,~[f~  -  AU~,~]  } 




+  (I +  C)K .''In  (k = 1,2,  ...,  n), 
C  Cvi,j  i=1 j=1 
and  the solution for y,  is where vi, is the ij  th element-  of the inverse variance-covariance matrix 
of the asset shares Aj  . 
Setting g = g,  p  = 0,  and 6 =  0  in equations  (13)  and  (14)  gives 
the results for the case of fixed-rate deposit insurance premiums.  The fixed- 
rate,  equations are identical to Lam  and Chen's equations  (14)  and  (15)  and are 
analogous to Koehn and Santomero's risk-free deposit case when g = 0.  Note 
that yl  is smaller under risk-based deposit insurance than under 
fixed-rate deposit in~urance.~  In other words, the capital requirement has 
less impact on portfolio composition for banks paying risk-based premiums'  than 
for banks paying fixed-rate premiums.  This is consistent with our hypothesis 
that with correctly priced deposit insurance  (that  is,  a full resolution of 
the agency problem),  asset portfolio decisions are independent of capital 
structure decisions. 
As in Lam  and Chen, the optimal asset share is a function of the expected 
asset returns adjusted for outside risk weighted by the elements of the 
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inverse of the variance-covariance matrix.  By rearranging (13), 4 is 
shown to be a function of rl and the price of risk-bearing,  A.  In 
fact, our fixed-rate deposit insurance result is identical to Lam  and Chen's 
result when Regulation  Q prevails. 
When variable-rate deposit insurance is introduced into the model, 
4 is also a function of the insurance-premium  risk adjustment,  p Through p, risk-based deposit insurance reduces the influence of the term 
in parentheses in expression  (13)  on 4.  More interesting,  however, 
4 is not a function of the deposit insurance premium, g,  and the 
deposit insurance leverage adjustment,  6.  This implies that the portfolio 
decision is independent of the response of the insurance premium to a change 
in leverage and of the level of the premium.  On the other hand, 4 
P 
is a function of the change in the cost of deposit insurance due to a change 
in the risk of the bank's portfolio, p.  This is consistent with our 
maintained hypothesis that agency problems induced by fixed-rate deposit 
guarantees are the source of Lam and Chen's and Koehn and Santomero's 
indeterminate results on the impact of a change in the capital requirement on 
the probability of default. 
IV.  The Joint Effects of Risk-Based Deposit Insurance Premiums 
and Changing Capital Requirements on  Portfolio Behavior 
The impact of capital requirements on bank portfolio behavior can be seen 
by looking at their impact on asset portfolio risk, asset portfolio 
composition,  and bank profitability.  The change in 4 with respect to C is 
(k  =  1,2,  ...,  n), 
where,  for simplicity,  we assume  - 0.  For banks with fixed-rate deposit  aT  - insurance, the last term on the right side of equation  (15)  equals 4. 
The sign of equation  (15)  is indeterminate because we do not know 
n  n 
the signs of 1  vk,j  [fj  -  Xu.  ]  and 1  vkCj  .6  Restrictions in the model require 
J .w 
j=1  j=1 
the other terms in equation  (15)  to be positive.  The indeterminate sign on 
equation  (15)  is consistent with the findings of Lam and Chen.  That is,  an 
increase in the capital constraint  (a  decrease in C)  may cause the bank to 
choose a riskier portfolio.  Again, this is because we have not assumed that 
the deposit guarantor correctly prices the insurance. 
The change in yl  with respect to C is 
Setting p  =  0  and 6 =  0  in  (16)  gives a^ll  for a bank with fixed-rate deposit  ac 
insurance.  Since p  and 6 are positive in the risk-adjusted  case, 
is greater for banks with risk-adjusted deposit insurance than for banks with 
d 
fixed-rate deposit insurance.  Adjusting deposit-insurance premiums for risk 
causes deposit costs to move directly with C.  Therefore, the risk-adjusted 
spread moves inversely with leverage.  Since yl  equates the marginal 
risk-adjusted spread for all assets in the portfolio,  and is inversely related 
to leverage  (holding  the cost of deposits constant)  ,  risk-adjusted premiums 
magnify the response of rl  to changes in C To  isolate the effects of  risk-based deposit insurance on  the portfolio 
a  Y 
allocation decision, let  fl  =  Lunder  fixed-rate deposit insurance.  ac 
Substituting /3  into equation (15)  gives us 
n 
-  ~(21)-'R  1  vk,  (k = 1,2,  ...,  n). 
j=1 
The  first two  terms on  the right side of  equation  (17)  represent the 
effects of  risk-based adjustments in the deposit-insurance  premium  on  the 
portfolio allocation decis2on.  The  first term is the joint effect of 
risk-based deposit insurance and  leverage changes on  the portfolio adjustment 
process separate from  changes  in yl.  The  second  term picks up  the 
portfolio adjustment  because of  changes  related to changes  in 7,.  The 
last term  in (17)  is the effect of  a change  in C on 4 due  to the 
change  in  yl (controlling for the effects of  risk-based deposit 
insurance).  It is the adjustment of  asset k's portfolio share resulting from 
a  change  in  C  under  fixed-rate deposit insurance.  Therefore,  the portfolio 
adjustment process is more  complicated for a bank with risk-based deposit 
insurance than for a  bank with fixed-rate deposit insurance.' To analyze the joint effects of risk-based insurance and changes in 
capital requirements on internal portfolio risk,  we multiply both sides of 
equation  (12)  by Pk  and sum over all k.  Substituting o:  =  CVjZ,ii)  = 
n  n  n 
1  AiAjoi,j  and  (1  +  C)K  =  1  A,  into this expression and solving for the  ' 
i=1  j=1  j=1 
asset portfolio variance yields 
n 
(18) o;  =  (2[A +  pCK])-'(  1  Ai(ti -  A,)  +  [R(1  +  yl) +  g +  lCK]  (1  +  C)K). 
i=l 
Letting ai  =  Fi -  AU,,~  and plugging A;  and y1 from  (13)  and  (14) 
into  (18)  gives us 
If we set p  = 0,  equation  (19)  is the variance of earnings in the 
fixed-rate deposit case.  Note that like A:,  0:  is not a function of S or g. 
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Furthermore, because p  is positive,  the variance of portfolio earnings for 
a bank with fixed-rate deposit insurance is greater than the variance of 
earnings for a bank with risk-based deposit insurance.  This result holds for 
all values of C.  The change in o:  with respect to C is As in Lam and Chen,  the sign of equation  (20)  igpositive  for banks with 
fixed-rate deposit insurance  (p  = 0) and uncertain for banks with 
risk-based insurance.  Therefore, the joint effect of a more restrictive 
capital constraint and risk-based deposit-insurance premiums may be to 
increase bank portfolio risk.8  However,  because the value of  (19)  is 
greater when banks face fixed-rate premiums than when they face risk-based 
premiums for all C,  risk-based premiums result in less internal risk than do 
fixed-rate premiums regardless of the sign of (20).  Therefore, risk-based 
deposit-insurance premiums do not introduce any new perverse effects into the 
analysis. 
Bank regulators and some private marker bank analysts view the level of 
profits as an important factor in determining the value of equity.  To analyze 
the impact of a change in the capital requirement on expected profits,  we 
substitute 4 from  (13)  into  (2)  to yield expression  (21). If we  set g =  g  and  p  = 0, the above  expression is the expected 
profits for a bank with. fixed-rate deposit insurance.  As expected, when  the 
risk profile of  the bank  results in a risk-based premium,  g, equal  to the 
fixed rate premium,  g, profits are lower  for the bank  paying  risk-based  . 
premiums  than for the bank  paying fixed-rate premiums.  For  both fixed-rate 
and  risk-based insurance, the effect of  a change  in C  on  expected profits is 
ambiguous.  Since expected profits are not adjusted for risk, it is possible 
for a  relaxation of  the capital constraint to increase the value of  the firm 
and  to reduce profits.  This result was  also found by  Lam and  Chen. 
V.  Risk-Based  Deposit  Ipsurance,  Capital Requirements,  and  Bankruptcy 
The  only time  the FDIC  must  honor  its guarantees  is when  a bank  fails. 
Therefore,  for the FDIC,  the impact of  changing  the capital requirement  on  the 
risk of  bankruptcy is an important  issue.  A  bank's  bankruptcy risk is a 
function of  asset portfolio risk and  leverage.  An  increase in the capital 
requirement  reduces leverage,  so an  increase in internal risk in response  to increased capital requirements does not necessarily increase bankruptcy risk. 
Following Koehn and Santomero and Lam and Chen, and we use Chebyshev's 
Inequality as an upper bound for bankruptcy risk.  The probability of failure, 
P, is 
Holding C constant,  the impact of risk-based deposit insurance is to reduce 
both the numerator and denominator of P.  Therefore,  the impact of risk-based 
insurance on default risk is uncertain.  On  the other hand,  a reduction in the 
variance of  earnings should reduce the expected loss to the FDIC when a bank 
fails.  From this standpoint,  risk-based deposit insurance produces a 
desirable result. 
Lam and Chen show that the impact of changing the capital requirement on 
P is 
aa2  112  a~(5)). 
(23)  :%  =  [E(Z)  -  K]-'(  -  2P  ac  "~3i.r 
As in Lam and Chen, the sign of expression (23)  Is indeterminate for 
fixed-rate deposit insurance.  It is also indeterminate when risk-based 
deposit insurance is introduced.  Our inability to sign (23)  for banks with 
risk-based deposit insurance is at least partially due to our assumption that the FDIC does not charge banks for the fair value of their insurance.  Thus, 
our risk-based insurance scheme does not remove all of the agency costs 
associated with underpriced deposit insurance. 
VI.  Conclusion 
Previous analyses of the impact of increased capital requirements on bank 
portfolio behavior implicitly or explicitly assume that deposit insurance is 
mispriced.  We contend that the mispricing is responsible for the incentive to 
increase leverage and that correct pricing would make the capital constraint 
no longer binding.  By modifying the cash flow version of the CAPM to 
incorporate a put option formulation  for deposit insurance,  we examine the 
impact of increased capital requirements when deposit rates vary with 
portfolio risk and leverage. 
We  find that,  with risk-  and leverage-related deposit rates,  the incentive 
to increase leverage is smaller than when the deposit rate and insurance 
premium are fixed.  Allowing explicit deposit costs to vary with risk and 
leverage also reduces the portfolio variance.  In  addition, asset choice is 
influenced by the response of the risk premium to increases in portfolio 
variance. 
.d 
The impact of increased capital requirements on portfolio behavior, 
however,  is generally ambiguous and broadly similar to the results of Lam and 
Chen.  The impact of increased capital requirements on asset choice is 
indeterminate,  as are the responses of portfolio variance, expected profits, 
and the probability of bankruptcy.  However,  our failure to impose correct 
pricing may be responsible for these indeterminacies.  Nonetheless,  allowing deposit rates to vary with portfolio risk and leverage results in reductions 
in portfolio variance and the incentive to increase leverage.  These would 
seem to be desirable results from a regulator's  viewpoint. Footnotes 
Correct pricing means  that the deposit guarantor charges  a deposit 
insurance premium equal  to the risk premium  the market would  charge for 
uninsured deposits  (see Thomson  [1987]). 
The  owner-manager  assumption is used  to resolve  the agency  problem  that 
may  exist between  outside stockholders and managers  (see Jensen and  - 
Meckling  [I9761  ) . 
This differs from  Lam  and  Chen's  stochastic interest-rate case where  the 
capital constraint multiplier may  be larger or smaller than the capital 
constraint multiplier in the deterministic deposit case. 
The  explanation for this result is that g and  6 affect the expected 
risk-adjusted spreads for each asset equally.  Therefore,  they do  not 
alter the relative risk-return trade-off between the assets. 
Lam  and Chen  also get an  indeterminate result for the net effect of  more 
stringent capital requirements on  overall bank  risk in their stochastic 
deposit case. 
n 
If we  restrict 4 >  0  for all k, then  xvk  j[Pj  -  loj,,]  > 0.  However, 
j=1  ' 
this restriction does  not allow us  to sign expression (15). 
Lam and Chen  get the same  result when  they relax Regulation Q.  The 
process of  portfolio adjustment in response  to a change  in the binding 
capital constraint is more  complicated  in their stochastic deposit-rate 
case than in the deterministic case. 
Separation between capital structure and  portfolio decisions does  not 
hold in  our model  because we  do  not assume  that the deposit guarantor 
charges banks a premium  equal to the fair value of  the deposit 
guarantees. 
d 
Even  though we  do  not assume  correctly priced deposit guarantees,  we  do 
not get perverse effects from  risk-based premiums  (see Pyle  [1983]) 
because we  assume  that the  FDIC  does  not make  relative pricing errors 
(that is, it can measure  risk and  price it consistently). References 
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